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Maria Gershuni
Sponsored by Robert Goeckel

ABSTRACT

The idea of the Eurasian Economic Union, or the EEU, was first brought up by Kazakhstan’s President
Nursultan Nazerbaev in 1994. By 2015, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the Treaty
for the Establishment of the EEU, making the idea a reality. The EEU currently occupies nearly 15% of the
earth’s land, and is the 12th largest economy in the world. However, very little is known about this integration
project. Criticized as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s pet project, and a hollow imitator of the European
Union, the EEU now faces challenges of imbalance, inequity, and further integration. However, the economic
bloc is poised to expand, with talks of incorporating Iran and Turkey into the Union. With the European
Union weakened by this summer’s Brexit, the question remains whether the EEU will take the opportunity to
expand into new spaces or whether integration projects all around the world are stalled in the anti-integration
political environment. Looking at the history, politics, and possibilities for the EEU, this analysis will examine the nuances of this largely unstudied organization and predict its future.

INTRODUCTION

Very little is known in the West about the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU or Eurasian Union), a single
market between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. However, many
in Central Asia and Eastern Europe consider it to be
the next stage in Eurasian development and cooperation. The lack of knowledge regarding the Eurasian
Economic Union by American writers and scholars
comes in part from the rapid and recent creation and
evolution of the Union, and in part from the dearth
of American geographical understanding. One of the
more concerning issues regarding this paper was the
lack of geographic knowledge of the EEU member
states. This is particularly concerning since the regions of Central Asia and Eastern Europe lay directly
in the interests of rising powers such as China and
the Russian Federation. The Eurasian Economic Union is an example of the growing importance of the
Eurasian region as it tries to assert itself in the international political order.
In 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin
announced his plans to create a large scale integra-

tion project starting in the countries that previously
made up the Soviet space, he called it “a future being born today” (2011). Embedded into the project
was the hope that the EEU would become one of the
poles of a multipolar world, a partner and a balancer
to the European Union (EU) and the United States
(Putin, 2011). Though the EEU and the EU are normative competitors, the idea behind the EEU and
the inspiration for its institutions came from the EU.
Like the EU, the EEU evolved from a free trade area
in which duties and tariffs between nations within
the area were eliminated. It then became a customs
union, setting a common external tariff on imports
from other nations. At the moment, both the EU
and EEU are working on eliminating all non-tariff
barriers between nations within the union, such as
burdensome regulations and quotas. In his speech
announcing the intention to create the EEU, Putin
even praised the EU for their integration model, and
specifically praised the Schengen Agreement: accords
that allowed citizens of EU nations free movement between the borders of participant states (Putin, 2011).
He explicitly stated the desire to recreate Schengen
to some extent within the participating countries of
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the Eurasian Union, to allow for better movement of
labor and capital between the nations.
However, in the summer of 2016, the integration
projects seemed to face an irreparable blow when, in
an unprecedented move, the United Kingdom voted
to leave the EU. This led many to question the viability of long term integration projects and their
attractiveness to member states. Since the Eurasian
Economic Union was explicitly based on the model
of the EU and often defines itself in relation to the
EU, questions about the future of the EEU rose as
well. Does Brexit spell bad news for the EEU, uncovering flaws with regional integration as a whole?
Or was Brexit beneficial to the development of the
EEU, exposing the flaws in a competitor’s model and
making the still unaligned nations of Eastern Europe
more hesitant to pursue European Union membership, as some writers claim (Walker, 2016)? Furthermore, since much of the rhetoric of the “Brexit” vote
was centered around a fear of migrants and refugees
taking advantage of the free movement clause of the
EU, will fear of backlash also prevent better implementation of free movement in the Eurasian Union?
The long term viability of the Eurasian Union,
however, is unrelated to events going on in Britain.
Though modeled on the European Union, various normative dimensions of the EEU are entirely
different from the EU and, occasionally, go against
the core foundation of the EU. Not only is the idea
of a referendum on membership foreign to the centralized, authoritarian leaning leadership of most
EEU member states, but technical implementation
of EEU policies has not been sufficiently executed
enough to produce a backlash. Long term viability of
the EEU depends on the ability of its institutions to
uphold their responsibilities under EEU treaties and
the commitment of the leaders to pursue successful
integration, not only in name, but in function.
The Eurasian Economic Union “stands a good
chance of becoming an inalienable part of the new
global architecture that is being created” (53), but
needs to overcome significant hurdles stemming
from its rapid integration and focus on solidifying
cultural boundaries of “Eurasianism,” versus creating
longstanding norms and institutions (Podberezkin &
Podberezkina, 2014). Using the lessons learned from
EU integration, we examine the challenges faced

the Eurasian Economic Union and understand the
changes that need to be implemented for the project to work. The unique aspects of EEU normative
framework allow it to be an attractive option for
countries wishing to engage in regional integration.
But in order for the project to be sustainable, further
deepening of integration must be paced more carefully, and the member states’ leaders must be committed in projecting a unified, functional agenda for
the future of the Eurasian Union.

EVOLUTION OF THE EEU

The idea for a concrete Eurasian Union was born
even before 1994, the year when the President of
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazerbayev, suggested creating a trade bloc and alliance structure he called
“The Eurasian Union” (Yesdauletova, & Yesdauletov,
2012). The historical roots for creating the union
stretch back to the Russian Empire, which existed
from 1721 to 1917. Currently, all members of the
EEU were once a part of the Empire or its protectorates, meaning they were economically subjected
to the rulings of the central government in Moscow
and in St. Petersburg. Some of the infrastructure that
core EEU industries depend on was created during the days of the Russian Empire, such as the rail
lines stretching across Central Asia (Cheng-Hin Lim,
2017). These rail lines provided the linkages among
which the economies of the peripheral areas of the
Russian Empire were connected to the center and
along which the modern freight industry is being organized (Cheng-Him Lin, 2017). The rising of the
USSR, from the still-smoldering ashes of the Russian
Empire, provided for the formation of the “Socialist
Republics” within the USSR. These states, including Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan
were also subordinate to the central government in
Moscow within the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic
(Shkaratam, 2015). The economies of the socialist republics were integrated under a Communist system,
but the partnerships were unequal and exploitative,
and therefore, unattractive to attempt and recreate
in a voluntary economic union (Shkaratam, 2015).
Almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR,
attempts were made to facilitate cooperation among
the now-independent states. The Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991
with the participation of ten Former-Soviet repub-
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lics (Yesdauletova, & Yesdauletov, 2012). The focus
of the organization was to provide a forum to discuss social issues such as human rights, and possible
military cooperation (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov,
2012). However, implementation mechanisms of
the CIS were relatively weak and some CIS countries
wanted further cooperation. In 1994, CIS countries
started negotiations on a free trade area, but negotiations were only completed in 2011, when the CIS
Free Trade Area was established by eight of the CIS
member states (Radzievskaya, 2014).
However, individual members of the CIS were frustrated at the lack of immediate progress and began to
pursue further economic integration (Radzievskaya,
2014). Russia and Belarus signed the Agreement on
Establishing a Customs Union in 1995, which outlined their intention to work on harmonizing external tariffs. In 1996, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
signed onto the Customs Union agreement, followed
by Tajikistan in 1998. The Eurasian Economic Community was formed in 2000, with all five signatories
of the Customs Agreement (Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) and three observer states (Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova) in order
to functionally set up the framework for a Customs
Union. The Eurasian Economic Community worked
on creating a streamlined procedure for currency exchanges, creating a common market for key industries such as energy and transport, and worked on
increasing cross border entrepreneurship opportunities. In 2010, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia finally
created the Eurasian Customs Union.
As soon as the Customs Union was created, work began on further integration (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). In 2012, a Single Economic Space was
created between the three Customs Union member
states which aimed to remove all physical and technical barriers to movement of labor, goods, and capital.
Both the treaty establishing the Customs Union and
the Single Economic Space were terminated by the
Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union which was
signed in 2014, and came into force on 1 January
2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan signed in January
and August respectively and negotiations for Tajikistan’s participation are underway as of 2017. Proponents of the project claim that the EEU is “viable”
and not “declarative” like previous agreements such
as the CIS (Radzievskaya, 2014, p. 7). Currently, the
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Union encompasses 180 million people, stretches
over 15% of the world’s land (International Crisis
Group, 2016). It spans 12 different time zones and
is looking only to grow (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov,
2012). Though Ukraine and Georgia withdrew from
previous Eurasian cooperative agreements, in part
because of obligations imposed by their EU Association Agreements, and in part because of conflicts
with the Russian Federation, the EEU is considering
countries such as Uzbekistan, Iran, and Turkey to be
potential collaborators in the long run (Cheng-Hin
Lin, 2017).
Two vital conclusions can be drawn from examining
the historical legacy and recent evolution of the Eurasian Union. The first is that there is an underlying
foundation of inequality embedded in the relationship between the nations of the Union. Relations between Russia and the nations in the periphery of the
Russian Empire and of the USSR were exploitative
and unequal. Therefore, critics both inside and outside the union were wary of any integration projects
in the post-Soviet space because of the possibility of a
resurgence of such relationships.
Some, like former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, claimed that the Eurasian Union was simply an
attempt by Russia to recreate the USSR “under the
guise of economic integration” (Glazyev, 2015, p.
93). However, Russia quickly rebuked those claims.
Membership in the economic union was purely voluntary, and based on mutual interests. Russian Presidential aide for the formation of the Customs Union between Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, Sergei
Glazyev said that:
“Unlike the EU or the US empires,
which coerce other countries by force of
arms and the power of their reserve currencies, Eurasian integration is a voluntary association of people who have lived
side by side for centuries.” (2015, p. 93)
He went on to further underscore the EEU’s focus
on individual sovereignty and mutual economic
prosperity as the cornerstone of the EEU’s creation.
Putin specifically denied imperialistic accusations in
his 2011 speech, saying that the EEU is not intended
to be “fortress Eurasia” (Kazantsev, 2015, p. 215). Instead, the EEU is intended to be a link between Eu-
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rope and the Asia-Pacific, unified by common values
and norms, and embracing of the liberal approach to
integration.
In order to internally ameliorate fears regarding
USSR re-creation, Belarus and Kazakhstan worked
to make “equality” one of the principles of the EEU
(Sevim, 2013, p. 53). Specifically, President Nazerbayev of Kazakhstan was cautious of allowing Russia
too much influence in the Union because Kazakhstan is the only EEU member to share a long border
with Russia, and has a sizable Russian population in
the north (Nurgaliyeva, 2016). When signing the
agreement to join the EEU, Nazerbayev assured his
people that this was not a return to the Soviet era
by asserting that Kazakhstan will act as a balancer to
Russia in the EEU and will never be submissive to
Russia (Nurgaliyeva, 2016, p. 94). At least on paper,
there seems to be a genuine attempt to represent the
Union as a partnership of equals without any hint of
Soviet-ism.
The second conclusion to be drawn from examining
the evolution of the EEU is that post-Soviet integration has been extremely rapid. For a project that often
compares itself to the EU, the timelines of evolution
couldn’t be more divergent. The European Union
began as the European Coal and Steel Community
with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (McCormick & Olsen, 2011). The European Union as it
is known today was only established in 1993 by the
Maastricht Treaty and it wasn’t until the completion
of the internal market in 1994, that the EU able to
facilitate and regulate free movement of labor, goods,
and services inside its borders. Furthermore, one of
the core institutions of the European Union, the European Council, was only established in 2000, while
the Eurasian Union equivalent was created immediately following the formation of the Customs Union.
The Eurasian Union integration pace is generally the
result of a top-down process by governments who
sought closer economic ties (Yesdaultova & Yesdauletov, 2012). Because industries such as natural gas and
transport are partially or wholly owned by the state in
Eurasia, the interests of these industries were heavily
considered in the decision making process to integrate. Furthermore, integration occurred so rapidly
that results from the previous stages of integration
were impossible to measure before the next stage of

integration was pursued. This has had a tremendous
impact on the creation of institutions and on output.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand the process behind this rapid
integration of the Eurasian Economic Union, we can
look to the theoretical backgrounds of integration
projects. Theories of international relations serve to
explain the impetus behind the formation of regional
organizations. The theories of international relations
that will be examined in the context of the EEU are
neo-liberal institutionalism, the functionalist theory
of integration, transactional theory of integration,
and neo-realism.
Proponents of the EEU claim that neo-liberal institutionalism serves as the foundation for the integration project, much like it did for the European Union
project. Neo-liberal institutionalists claim that states
overcome the anarchy inherent in the international
system by creating governing institutions and ceding
some sovereignty to these institutions (Keohane &
Nye, 2012). These institutions, in turn, create rules
and norms which states have to obey (Keohane &
Nye, 2012). This theory contends that mutual prosperity, peace, and order will result from the creation
of these governing institutions (Keohane & Nye,
2012, p. 163). The anarchy and instability resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed
for some nations in the post-Soviet space to seek out
order and peace through multilateral governance,
and the creation of regimes and norms (“Introducing
the Eurasian Economic Union,” 2014). Neo-liberal
institutionalism is fundamental to all regional integration projects because it requires some seceding of
sovereignty for mutual peace and prosperity. Economic integration through multilateral institutions
allows for greater mutual prosperity because of the
“economies of scale” argument, the principle that
production costs can be saved by increasing demand
for a good and its production (Rosencrance, 2012, p.
356). Therefore, increasing unfettered market access
within Eurasia would be advantageous to producers
and consumers, who would benefit from lower cost
goods. The first few years of the project already saw
an increase in prosperity, with trade within the Union increasing by 30% (Rosencrance, 2012, p. 356).
Therefore, some neo-liberal institutionalists might
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say that the rules regime created by the economic integration of Eurasia has worked.
Within liberalism, there are theories regarding the
different paths that states use to integrate. In postWorld War II Europe, Robert Schuman and Jean
Monnet believed in sectoral integration of the economies of France and Germany (Monnet, 2014). They
believed that integrating certain sectors of the economy, in the European case, coal and steel, would lead
to peaceful relations between nations. The European
continent had just come out of two world wars, and
the plan, which became known as the “Schuman
Plan” was the foundation of the European Coal and
Steel Community (Monnet, 2014, p. 21). The Community, composed of France, Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, was supposed
to ensure stability and prosperity on the European
continent by integrating some of their most vital industries (Monnet, 2014, p. 21). The Schuman and
Monnet logic, though not explicit, was foundationally a part of the formation of the Eurasian Union.
The sectoral drive behind the Eurasian Union, however, was not coal and steel (Niemi, 2017). Rather it
was natural gas and oil, the most important sector of
Russia and the Central Asian economies. “Pipeline
politics,” the political negotiations behind the acquisition and transport of oil and natural gas reserves
in Eurasia, drove much of the original negotiations
behind economic integration since it was the sector
providing most of the funding to carry out further
projects. The nationally owned natural gas and oil
companies, Gazprom in Russia and KazMunayGas
in Kazakhstan, required both business and governmental cooperation in order to extract natural gas
and ship it to Europe. The Belarusian government is
also a vital cooperator in pipeline politics, since pipelines running through Belarus allow gas companies
to export their products to Europe. The Soviet Union meant pipelines could be built and run with the
mandatory cooperation of all Republics involved and
with assured stability. The break-up of the Soviet Union was an event akin to the Second World War, putting stability in Eurasia at risk, and therefore, Pipeline Politics would push for stability via economic
cooperation.
Sectoral integration leads to the question of whether
it was functional integration that drove the Eurasian

Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017

77

project. Functional integration, and its doctrinal successor neo-functionalism, say that integration is pursued in sectors where it is most profitable (Mitrany,
2014). Integration produces needs for other sectors
to begin integrating that are related to the first sectors, or for political policy and governance to be created in order to better accommodate the integrated
sectors. This effect is called “spill-over” and theorists
like David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas claim that
spill-over was one of the driving forces behind the
further integration of the European Union (Haas,
2014, p. 145).
In the Eurasian Union, one might be able to see
functional integration in the oil and natural gas industry, spilling over into other industries such as
transportation, shipping, and communications. The
links that were formed between government officials
and business leaders, during pipeline negotiations
made it easier for connections to be forged in other
industries that would be benefited by closer integration. The shipping industry is a prime example of
this. Before the formation of the Eurasian Union,
98% of all trade between the Asia-Pacific and Europe
went through the Suez Canal in Egypt (Lysokon,
2012, p. 7). However, the EEU’s focus on increasing
the speed and lowering the costs of freight traffic will
make shipping across land twice as fast and half as
expensive (Lysokon, 2012, p. 7). Therefore, freight
traffic is projected to rise by 490 million tons annually by 2020, four times the growth than in the years
between 2000 and 2010 (Lysokon, 2012, p. 7).
This looks like sectoral spillover from original negotiations to integrate the oil and gas industry. However, it is very difficult to discern whether or not the
Eurasian Union came as a result of functional integration, because the industries that were benefitted
from integration were government owned (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). While functionalism is
supposed to be driven by demand from the industries
and the “invisible hand” of the market determining
which sectors are most benefited from integration,
integration in the Eurasian Union has been primarily government driven (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov,
2012). There has been benefits in industries, but
those industries, such as rail traffic and natural gas,
are owned by the government and therefore would
naturally be privileged in government orchestrated
integration. Furthermore, functionalist integration
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takes time to naturally progress, and, as we will see,
the Eurasian Union has been integrating too quickly
to let functionalism run its market-driven course. It
is clear that functionalism is not the primary driving
factor behind the creation of the Eurasian Union.
The transactionalist approach to regional integration
explains the formation of the Eurasian Economic
Union better. Transactionalism was a theory championed by Karl W. Deutsch in an attempt to explain
the successful integration of the European community (Deutsch, 2014, p. 125). He claimed that integration was a long-term process that took place after sustained contact with people from different states, in
key areas of political involvement. His theory “concluded that successful integration required a sense of
community — a “we feeling” based on a common
set of values” (Deutsch, 2014, p. 125). Deutsch also
stressed the importance of transactions that political
actors have prior to the integration project’s start. Political and business actors in Eurasia had prolonged
contact with each other during the Soviet period.
When the Soviet Union fell, their interactions continued and allowed for easy lines of communication
between political boundaries, making integration negotiations easier.
Deutsch’s idea of a “we feeling” as a prerequisite to
successful integration has been a vital factor to the
drive behind Eurasian integration. The historical and
cultural community stretching across Eastern Europe
and Central Asia has inspired the doctrine known as
“Eurasianism” (International Crisis Group, 2016).
Eurasianism has its roots in the Russian diaspora
that occurred after the Bolshevik Revolution (Niemi,
2017). Early Eurasianists, such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy
and L.M. Gumilyov, believed there was a new Orthodoxical, Slavic center of civilization concentrated
around Russia (Duncan, 2015, p. 102). Eurasianism rejects the notion of Euro-centrism, and does
not regard Greco-Roman development as the start of
all civilization (Radzievskaya, 2014). Russia and the
Slavic lands are not on the periphery of Europe, the
doctrine claims, but rather are in the center of their
own “third way” of civilizational development (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 7). Eurasianism
also rejects the notion that there is a “high-culture,”
which a culture consumed by the elites, and “low-culture” consumed by the masses (Radzievskaya, 2014,
p. 80). Eurasianists believe that there is an accessible

Slavic culture that stretches across a “vast unbroken
landmass bounded on its edges by the high mountain
ranges of the Himalayas, Caucasus and Alps, and the
large bodies of water like Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic
Oceans, and the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian
Seas” (Sevim, 2013, p. 52).
Eurasianists describe Eurasian culture as distinct from
both the cultures of Western Europe and East Asia,
as well as a mix of both (International Crisis Group,
2016, p. 6). It is traditionalist and conservative, valuing hard work and the family. It does not emphasize
the importance of each individual, but rather stresses
the importance of society as a whole. Some theorists
also claim that Orthodoxy and Christianity is vital
to Eurasianism, since Eurasian expansion stems back
from the Kievan “Holy Rus,” and therefore, piety is
considered a marker of Eurasian identity (Shkaratam,
2015, p. 29). Some Eurasianists reject Peter the Great
as a national icon, because they believe he pivoted
too far toward Europe, sacrificing the Russian soul
in the process (Shkaratam, 2015, p. 30). However,
Eurasianism also stresses the importance of economic and geographical ties with Europe, not rejecting
the European continent completely, but acting as an
equal partner while keeping European influences on
culture at a distance (Shkaratam, 2015, p. 30).
Because Eurasianism is a theory without any set
boundaries however, it has been difficult to define,
resulting in diverging schools of thought. Vladimir
Putin, for example, is considered by some scholars
to be a “pragmatic Eurasianist,” because he has historically approached a balanced policy between outreach to the East and the West (Sevim, 2014, p. 47).
On the other hand, far right Eurasianists such as
Alexander Dugin, founder of the Eurasia Party and
advisor to Vladimir Putin, approaches Eurasianism
from a geo-political perspective (International Crisis
Group, 2016, p. 5). Dugin and his ideological brethren, believe that the “Great Game” between major
powers dictates Eurasia must rise to challenge the
United States, which far right Eurasianists consider
to be Eurasia’s chief civilizational rival. Far right Eurasianists further believe that the borders of Central
Asia and Eastern Europe are artificially drawn and
do not reflect the unified Eurasian civilization that
resides in these regions, regardless of ethnic background (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 5).
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Furthermore, there have been inconsistencies with
using Eurasianism as the transactional basis for
Eurasian Union integration. First, transactions between people of different Eurasian nations have been
limited to the upper political and economic classes
(Radzievskaya, 2014). Working class people, especially those engaged in agricultural industries which
continue to make up a significant portion of the Eurasian economy, have had very little contact with peoples from other nations, especially in vast countries
such as Kazakhstan and Russia (Radzievskaya, 2014).
Furthermore, only 8% of Russians polled in 2013
view all ethnic groups within Russia, including Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Armenians, and Belarussians, equally
(Sakwa, 2015a, p. 21). There was a clear preference in
the poll for European-looking Russians, which seems
to stand in clear objection to the founding principles
of Eurasianism. It seems that Eurasianism is a doctrine most easily embraced by the upper political and
economic classes, who have had substantial interaction with other Eurasian nations and stand to benefit
from political and economic integration.
The doctrine of Eurasianism, around which the
“we feeling” of transactional integration is centered
around has been imposed top-down on the populations of Eurasia by being peppered into the rhetoric of
speeches and policies of national leaders. Eurasianism
has been at the center of Nazerbayev’s “multi-vector
foreign policy” for Kazakhstan since he first became
President in 1991 (International Crisis Group, 2016,
p. 5). Putin believes that it is the role of the Eurasian
space to be the bridge between the East and West
(Cheng-Hin, 2017). However, this sentiment is not
commonly held among the people in their nations,
whose memory of a united Eurasia is limited to the
Soviet experience, and therefore Eurasianist has had
to be reinforced by government policy. This is not to
say that it is impossible for carefully crafted policy
initiatives and cultural programs imposed top-down
to stir Eurasianist sentiment among the people of the
Eurasian Economic Union. However, since government-initiated community building projects are not
the natural progression for the creation of Deutsch’s
“we feeling,” the Eurasian Union would have to be an
experiment in top-down imposed identity.
Finally, we can look to the theory of neorealism in
order to explain the drive behind integration in Eurasia. Many critics of the Eurasian Union Project claim
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that it is a product of geo-political, realist thinking.
Nicolas J. Spykman, American realist thinker and
the “godfather of containment” policy during the
Cold War, once famously said, “Who rules Eurasia,
controls the destinies of the world (Sevim, 2013, p.
45).” Russia has been accused of following this logic
through neo-imperialist methods, by using economics rather than military might to tighten connects
between the member states of the Eurasian Union
(Sevim, 2013, p. 45). Some have also accused Russia
of following a neo-revisionist doctrine by undermining the liberal economic order from within in order
to follow a realist agenda (Sakwa, 2015b, p. 163).
Neorealism acknowledges the existence of multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Union, but
believes that these organizations only reflect current
power dynamics and do not have an influence on policy making. Applying this theory to the evolution of
the Eurasian Union makes several key assumptions.
First, it rejects the notion of Eurasianism as a genuine driving force behind the integration or claims it
is being applied “defensively,” as to avoid criticism
of neo-imperialism (Podberezkin & Podberezkina,
2014, p. 7). In fact, some critics dismiss the notion of
Eurasianism in general claiming there are “no unifying ideas in Eurasianism, but only geographical convenience with a whiff of transnational imperialism”
(Podberezkin & Podberezkina, 2014, p. 7). Neorealism also assumes that Russia, as the wealthiest
and most militarily advanced country in the Union,
is the center of the integration project and the rest
of the members as akin to “satellite states” (Standish,
2015). This approach dismisses the large influence
of Kazakhstan in the creation and evolution of the
EEU. However, examining the institutions and politics within the EEU will reveal the power dynamics,
relative benefits of cooperation, and may shed light
on the theories used.

INSTITUTIONS

The head executive and bureaucratic arm of the
Eurasian Economic Union is the Eurasian Economic
Commission (International Crisis Group, 2016, p.
9). The Eurasian Commission was modeled on the
European Commission, which governs the European Union. The Commission was originally started
to govern the Single Economic Space in 2012, and
was incorporated into the governing structure of the

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Maria Gershuni.
Published by KnightScholar,
2018 Future of Integration or Failure in the Making.
The Eurasian Union:
The Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 79-91.

7

80

Proceedings
The Proceedings of GREAT Day
2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

EEU with the 2014 Treaty on the EEU. The Commission currently has approximately 2,000 staff
working for it and is headquartered in Moscow, although the Moscow headquarters are not meant to
be permanent. Currently, the Commission is tasked
with running the day to day operations with the Union, allocating budgets, solving sectoral issues, and
upholding EEU treaties.
At the moment, there are approximately 2,000 staffers at the EEU headquarters, and it has two main
organs: the Council of the Eurasian Economic
Commission and the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission (“Struktura,” 2017). The first
is the Council of the Eurasian Commission, which
is composed of the Deputy-Prime Ministers from
each members state, who share a rotating president
between them. The Council has the primary function of approving decisions made by the Board, and
has the power to veto decisions made by the Board.
However, this rarely happens because decisions on
the Council are reached by consensus. The Board of
the Eurasian Economic Commission is made up of
14 Ministers of the Board, three from each member
state and two from Kyrgyzstan. Working under the
Board of Ministers are bureaucrats from 23 functional departments, such as the Department of Energy and the Department Antimonopoly Regulation,
which each Minister heads. Decisions within the
Board of the Eurasian Commission are made based
on Qualified Majority Voting, where each minister
has one vote. Decisions the board makes are binding
if they are agreed to by two-thirds of the Ministers.
While these two bodies make decisions regarding
day-to-day operative policies of the EEU, anything
big or controversial gets sent up to the Council of the
Eurasian Union.
The Commission of the Eurasian Economic Union
has the power to truly be a supranational institution
(Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). With its decision making, it can move power away from federal
governments and into the multilateral institutions.
However, it faces some challenges. First, the Commission does not have any real sanction power (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). It mostly enforces its decisions though peer pressure and political
leverage (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10).
Furthermore, it is difficult for the Commission to
operate as a rules based organization because it often

sidelined by political leaders who want to make deals
rather than follow rules (International Crisis Group,
2016, p. 9). Therefore, an excessive amount of issues
get bumped up to the level of the Supreme Council
of the Eurasian Union because political leaders primarily use that as a forum for negotiating acquisitions and concessions.
The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the
highest level organ of the Eurasian Union. It is based
off of the European Council, where European heads
of government meet to discuss the direction and strategic planning of the Union. The Supreme Eurasian
Economic Council also facilitates meetings between
the heads of government of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation
(Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). The Supreme Council is tasked with determining the future prospects of the EEU, including further areas
of integration, possible new members, and current
projects (International Crisis Group, 2016). The
Council is also responsible for approving the budget
and determining the contribution of member states
(Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). However,
while in the EU, the European Council is one of the
many important organs of the EU, and the Supreme
Eurasian Economic Council is considered the “main
body” of the EEU (Eurasian Economic Commission,
2015). As previously stated, the Supreme Eurasian
Economic Council is delegated tasks from the Commission and makes most of the key decisions inside
the Eurasian Union (International Crisis Group,
2016, p. 9). Because the Supreme Council gets heavy
use inside the EEU, the decisions within the EEU are
made by compromises between the heads of states.
This robs the EEU bureaucracy of the same agency
and influence their EU counterparts have.
The EEU also has a court modeled on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Eurasian Economic Union, 2015). The Court of the Eurasian Union was
originally founded in 2010 as part of the Eurasian
Economic Community, and like the Commission,
was incorporated into the Eurasian Union in 2015.
The Court is composed of two judges appointed by
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council from each
member state, who then serve nine-year terms on the
court. The Court has a similar mandate to the ECJ;
it’s charged with ensuring the uniform application of
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EEU treaties among member states. All the court’s
rulings are, in theory, supposed to be public.
However, the Court has gotten no use since its foundation. As of 2016, the court has not been used once
(International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). Considering the lack of news regarding court rulings, and the
empty “summary” and “acts of the court” pages on
the website of the Court of the Eurasian Union, it
seems that the court has not been active in 2017 either (Eurasian Economic Union, 2015). Private parties are hesitant to use the Court of the Eurasian Union because they prefer to settle out of court and out
of the public eye (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). The
member states of the EEU have not used the court
to settle disputes among each other, preferring other
means to dispute settlements such as going through
the head of state meetings in the Supreme Economic
Council.
It is also telling to see which EU institutions have
not been adopted into the framework of the EEU.
The EEU has no parliament, meaning it has no directly elected body. Russia has been at the forefront
of calling for the creation of a EEU parliament as one
of the legislative institutions of the EEU (Maloof,
2012). Putin is reportedly pushing “full speed ahead”
in preliminary negotiations for the creation of such
a body (Maloof, 2012). However, Russia is receiving
pushback from Kazakhstan and Belarus who believe
that the creation of a parliament is “premature” and
do not foresee the creation of a directly elected body
in the foreseeable future. It should be noted that if
the EEU parliament adopted the EU Parliament’s
proportional representation model, the Russian Federation would retain the most seats out of all EEU
member states. It should further be noted, however,
that the EU Parliament is considered to be the most
supranational body of the EU, bypassing the federal
governments of the EU member states entirely with
direct elections (McCormick & Olsen, 2011, p. 29).
Though Russia might be hoping to capitalize on their
large population in order to control an EEU institution, their push for supranational is noteworthy.
The EEU also does not have a common currency,
unlike the Eurozone within the EU which does. Despite the fallout from the Eurozone crisis, plans for
creating a new Eurasian common currency are projected to be completed by 2025 (Sudakov, 2014).
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There are proposals for the currency to be called the
“altyn” after the currency that was used at the time
Golden Horde, the Mongol Empire that controlled
vast swaths of Eurasia (Sudakov, 2014). The imagery
evoked on currency is symbolic of the culture that
uses the currency. The European Union, for example, has banknotes highlighting European architecture from throughout the continent. The fact that
the proposed currency is named after the Mongol
Empire, as opposed to something reminiscent of the
Kievan Rus for example, can be indicative of the definition of Eurasia lying closer to the heart of nomadic
culture, as opposed to a more Western orientation.
However, the name of the currency has not been set
in stone. Some proposals had the currency called the
“Yevraz,” after the Slavic pronunciation of “Eurasia”
as “Yevrazia” (The Moscow Times, 2015). Whatever
name the Eurasian Union chooses will not only reflect economic unity, but will also further reflect on
the definition of Eurasianism. President Nazarbayev
believes that one day, the currency, regardless of what
it’s called, will one day enter into the world as a reserve currency, further bolstering the power of the
Eurasian region (Sudakov, 2014).
By examining the institutions created, and not created, by the Eurasian Union, one sees both neoliberal
and realist influence. Missing, so far, is the transactional influence that would have united the region
under Eurasianism. Depending on how the monetary union project progresses, Eurasianism could
manifest itself in both the use and the design of the
common currency. There have been some neoliberal
institutionalist progressions made in the formation
of the Eurasian Economic Commission, which seems
to have an infrastructure that is capable of dealing
with sectoral issues. However, the accusations of realist power politics manifest themselves in the activity
of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, which
bypasses the Commission’s bureaucratic structures
and allow for federal politics to manifest themselves
in the multilateral organization. However, the realist assumption that the Eurasian Economic Union is
simply run by the Russian Federation is undercut by
the failure of the Russian Federation to push through
their agenda to create a Parliament. Therefore, with
significant reform to overcome obvious shortcomings, the Eurasian European Union has the institutional capacity to be an effective organization. This,
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however, would require deep commitment from its
leaders to further increase the EEU’s viability.

FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS

At the moment, the Eurasian Union is surrounded
on both sides by global powers. On the west, the European Union and the Eurasian Union are engaged
in a “normative rivalry,” in which they compete for
influence in a rules based regime (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). On the east is the rising power of China,
which also has initiatives and ambitions in Eurasia
(Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). Ideally, the Eurasian Union is looking to keep a balance of power
among the three, remaining within the cooperative
nature of multilateral institutions. However, because
both the European Union, the Eurasian Union, and
China hope to expand their influence, they often
find themselves in competition with each other.
China is a rising power that is starting to look to the
Eurasian region as a partner, and sometimes, rival for
expansionist influence (Cheng-Hin, 2016). Today,
China is the EEU’s largest trading partner and has
strong bilateral relations with individual members
of the Union. Kazakhstan and China have just successfully completed a massive rail project that now
connects the two countries. China has also given Belarus 5.5 billion USD in loans and conducts approximately 4 billion USD in trade with Belarus annually. Russia and China have collaborated on the New
Development Bank made up of the BRICS countries
of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Cooperation has been so strong that China and the
EEU are now in talks to create a free trade zone in
the near future.
However, it is unlikely that China would ever become incorporated into the EEU (Glazyev & Tkachuk, 2015, p. 81). Fundamentally, China is a competitor in the Central Asian space for influence.
China is planning on creating the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” a trade and cultural exchange initiative
that is meant to develop infrastructure and bi-lateral
relations between nations along the path of the Silk
Road and China. China has planned investment into
cities along Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and along the
Middle East, to the Caspian Sea. Because the initiative is still new, and the EEU has not entered into any
formal talks of association with candidate countries

that could potentially receive Chinese investment
funds, the partnership between the EEU and China
has been amicable. However, as both entities seek to
expand their influence, the positive relationship may
not last.
The relationship between the EU and the EEU has
been far more tense. In Putin’s speech announcing
the intention to create the EEU, he claimed it would
be a partner to the EU (Putin, 2011). Proponents
of the project claim that the EEU is complementary, not rival to the EU (Dzarasov, 2015, p. 125).
However, in practice the EU and the EEU have been
clashing in the shared neighborhood of Eastern Europe (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 6). The European Union is facing its own crisis with a flood of
migrants, uneven economic development, and the
rise of far right parties (Dragneva-Lewers & Wolczuk, 2015). However, Europe still is more attractive with potential candidate countries than Russia
(Seten, 2015). To combat this, the EEU has created a
normative framework that is more appealing to Eastern Europeans than the EU’s framework in order to
gain further partners and candidates (Seten, 2015).
One of the sources of tension between the EU and
the EEU is the proliferation of EU Association
Agreements (Sala, 2015, p. 165). Inside the EU these
agreements are viewed as declarations of friendship,
as well as affirmations that a state might eventually
join the EU (Sala, 2015, p. 167). However, there
have been some states who have signed the Association Agreements that have been consistently rejected
in their applications for membership. Turkey has had
an Association Agreement with the EU since 1963
and is currently in its fifth decade of waiting for EU
membership approval (Onis, 2004). Dutch voters recently held a non-binding referendum, rejecting the
opening of any negotiation chapters that would allow for the eventual membership of Ukraine, which
signed the Association Agreement in 2014 (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). The EU requires countries
wishing to sign an Association Agreement to reform
their government and economic systems, engaging
in democratization and aligning itself closer with the
rules of the EU, without allowing the associate members much say in the process (Dragneva & Wolczuk,
2015). Furthermore, the EU requires that Associate
Members do not participate in any other regional
trading blocs, preventing Eastern European countries
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from becoming observer states in the EEU while also
seeing associate EU membership (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015).
To combat this, the EEU has created a framework
that would make it easier to states to join without
conducting much internal reform. The EEU does
not allow for Association Agreements, but does
grant countries observer status in the bloc (Morgan,
2017). It also does not explicitly prohibit its members from signing Association Agreements with the
EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). In the EU, a set
of criteria labeled the “Copenhagen Criteria,” outline democratic standards that countries have to meet
before they can ascend to membership (McCormick
& Olsen, 2011, p. 81). The Eurasian Union has no
such criteria and only requires that a country be able
to take on the full set of agreements that were already
adopted by the Eurasian Union (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). Finally, the EEU is willing to offer
small countries a seat at the table of negotiation and
a more equal status than they would have received in
the EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). This approach seems to have a degree of appeal. Moldova, a
country once thought to be firmly on the side of Europe, has now applied for and was granted observer
state status in the EEU on April 18, 2017 (Morgan,
2017). Though the country still claims that it will
maintain the viability of their EU Association Agreement, it was noted that Ukraine was forced to give
up observer status in the EEU in order to be granted
EU associate membership (Petro, 2013). It is now up
the EU to decide how they will react to Moldova’s
observer status. However, one fears that escalation
of this dispute to the level of the Ukrainian conflict,
which revealed some of the weaknesses in the unity
and the governing framework of the EEU.

CRITICISMS AND CRISES

Though the EEU has made some strides toward progress, it is severely hampered by its lack of institutional capacity. This has severely weakened both the
ability of the EEU to implement some of its more
ambitious policies, as well as respond to crises. As
stated before, integration was very rapid. Though
this allowed for the countries within the Union so
solidify their definition of Eurasia, and enter into a
normative rivalry with the EU, it didn’t allow for a
natural evolution that would have allowed for more
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effective governance. First, it prevented policymakers
from examining the benefits and drawbacks of the
previous form of integration before moving onto the
next one (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012, p. 8).
Second, it rushed the creation and evolution of the
Eurasian Commission, preventing the formation of a
robust and egalitarian bureaucracy that would have
allowed for more supranational and equality among
EEU members.
While the EU was allowed to functionally integrate
from the European Coal and Steel Community to
the European Economic Community, and eventually
to the European Union, the EEU did not have that
benefit. The transactional ties formed over natural gas
and oil partnerships could have been a solid foundation for a hypothetical Eurasian Natural Gas and Oil
Community, however, it was not enough to form ties
over many various industries. Within the EEU, there
are simply “too many economic sectors requiring too
many regulations” and not enough time to determine
the best course of regulation for them all (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012, p. 10). There have been
benefits to some industries that were mostly owned
by the state, such as transport and heavy engineering
firms, but overall growth has slowed down (Standish,
2015). Seeing stagnation this early in the development of an integration project could spell trouble for
the future unless reforms are pursued.
The rapid speed of integration has also prevented the
creation of the robust institutions that are required
to fix these problems. The Eurasian Commission has
the staff and structure capable to work on ameliorating issues that come with rapid integration. However,
the overwhelming focus on state sovereignty within
the EEU has weakened the Commission and given
most of the power to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. Though the Commission is a rulesbased organization capable of decision making, decision making is not at the core of the former Soviet
space (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). Instead,
decisions are delegated to the highest level possible,
which in this case, is to the heads of state (Dragneva
& Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). This limits decision making to top-down deal making, at the highest level of
governance.
Delegating all decisions to the highest possible authority can further create mistrust and suspicion be-
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tween states (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Momynkulov, 2013, p. 476). Some Kazakhs feel that they have
lost out on key decision making processes within the
EEU and guard their sovereignty cautiously (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Momynkulov, 2013, p. 477).
Some argue that national interest should always take
priority over integration because they fear a return
to the Soviet days (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Momynkulov, 2013, p. 477). Worse, some fear that Russia will attempt to annex some of the Russian ethnic
majority areas in Northern Kazakhstan, just like Russia annexed Crimea (“Introducing the Eurasian Economic Union,” 2014). These fears force Kazakhstan’s
leaders to stall on political integration and ensure that
the EEU stays purely economic, halting projects like
the Eurasian Parliament (“Introducing the Eurasian
Economic Union,” 2014). Because the bureaucratic
and institutional structure of the Eurasian Union
is weak, power politics and realist fears are allowed
to flourish. It is clear that on a Council where the
heads of state are the only members, Putin, the most
powerful man in the world according to Forbes (“The
world’s most powerful people 2016,” 2016), would
reign supreme. However, if the bureaucracy played
a more important role in decision making, then the
Kazakhs (and Byelorussians and Armenians), who
are well-represented in the Councils and Boards of
the Commission, would no longer feel like they are
losing out on key decisions.
These institutional setbacks harm the way that the
EEU is able to respond to crises (Petro, 2013). No
discussion of the EEU is complete with analyzing the
setbacks it faced in the lead up and the aftermath of
the Ukraine crisis. Ukraine’s ousted President Yanukovych was weighing the costs and benefits of joining
either the Eurasian Customs Union or signing an Association Agreement with the European Union when
the crisis took place. Yanukovych abruptly pulled out
the EU negotiations in favor of a deal closer to Russia
and the Eurasian Union.
Supporters of this plan offered similar incentives to
the ones mentioned before. Ukraine, EEU proponents argued, “should be the cradle of Eastern European civilizations, not on the outskirts of other European powers” (Fesenko, 2015, p. 126). Some Russian
economists claimed that “the invisible hand of the
market” guides Ukraine toward Russia and Ukraine
would be better off as a member of the EEU than

with an EU Association Agreement. The Ukrainian
shipbuilding, aircraft, and mechanical engineering
industries, economists claimed, would all benefit
significantly within a decade of joining the Union
(Seten, 2015). Furthermore, supporters of Ukraine’s
pivot to the EEU said that the EU wasn’t offering
Ukraine membership, and that Ukraine would have
significantly more political power in the institutions
of the EEU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012, p. 13).
Critics of the EEU pivot claim that even under the
pro-Russian Yanukovych, Ukraine never made clear
commitments to join the EEU and only wanted partial membership at best (Dragneva-Lewers, Rilka, &
Wolczuk, 2015).
However, the abrupt shift away from the European
Union angered the Ukrainian population and the
move prompted the Euromaidan protests that ousted Yanukovych and caused Russia to annex Crimea
(Fesenko, 2015). This resulted in Russia annexing
Crimea in order to protect their interests on the peninsula, which resulting in the EU levying heavy sanctions against Russia. Russia’s response in turn was to
create sanctions against the European Union. In the
fallout, “the Kremlin hasn’t streamlined its political
incentives with its economic partners,” leading to an
inability to coordinate successfully retaliatory sanctions (Seten, 2015). Russia had to reinstate border
and customs controls in 2014 on the Russian-Byelorussian border because Russia was accusing Belarus
of allowing European goods to flow into Russia by
mislabeling them as Byelorussian (Niemi, 2016). Kazakhstan has refused to end business and trade with
the European Union, despite Russian requests to do
so (Furman & Libman, 2015). The EEU has been
entirely unhelpful in resolving trade related disputes
stemming from the Ukraine crisis, because it has not
had the institutional capacity to do so. Since most
of the controversial decisions were delegated to the
heads of state, national interests took precedence
over any issue, hampering any dispute settling function the EEU could have had.
What is possibly more concerning is the fact that
the EEU institutions are incapable of overcoming
sovereign conflicts that prevent effective implementation of existing policies. An example of institutional deficit is evidenced by the restrictions placed
on the free movement objective of the EEU. Putin
openly praised the Schengen Area within the EU for
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facilitating free movement of labor between countries (Putin, 2011). He and the EEU leaders hoped
to create the area within the EEU. Free movement
of labor within the EEU would benefit Russia, since
it is the second largest importer of labor, after the
United States and has an aging population similar to
that of Europe (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012).
Furthermore, the labor exporting Central Asian republics, as well as some countries in Eastern Europe,
would be able to profit on remittances and ensure
safer, easier passage of their population to and from
the Russian Federation (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). For these reasons, border controls were
eliminated in 2011 in order to facilitate better free
movement of labor between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Community (Radzievskaya, 2014).
“Free movement” became one of the core objectives
of the Eurasian Economic Union, embedded into its
founding treaty (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017). However, the agreement on free movement has not been
applied practically, and therefore remains mostly declarative (Radzievskaya, 2014). On paper, any citizen
of any of the EEU member states can live and work
in any other EEU member state. However, those attempting to do so will be faced with domestic bureaucratic restrictions that make it very difficult to
move to a new county, much less a new country.
Many of the problems regarding free movement
arise from strict and arcane registration systems that
began in the Russian Empire after the liberation of
the serfs (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). In order to
prevent mass migration of peasants to urban centers
and prevent the creation of slums, the Imperial Russian government created a registration system, called
the “propiska” system, that tied someone’s ability to
receive social services based on their permanent place
of residence (Schenk, 2015). It was difficult and expensive to change one’s registration, especially if one
wished to move from the countryside to the city. The
USSR kept this policy in order to control population flows and ensure the viability of collective farms
(Schenk, 2015). After the fall of the USSR, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia chose to keep their registry
systems in order to continue maintaining control
over population flow (Schenk, 2015). Therefore, a
Kazakh national who chooses to live and work in St.
Petersburg must go through a bureaucratically difficult, and expensive place of registry process, or risk
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not having access to education, healthcare, and legal
employment services (“Russian ombudsman,” 2007).
The EEU has not addressed these registration systems in their negotiations over free movement. It is
within the national interests of Russia, Belarus, and
Kyrgyzstan to keep their registry systems because it
collects revenue from registry permit fees and allows
government intervention into movement within
their own countries. Because of the focus on sovereignty within the EEU, national interests are allowed
to reign supreme over the interests of the trading
bloc. Therefore, even a fundamental tenet like free
movement of labor across borders, that might be mutually beneficial to all parties involved, is subject to
restriction at the domestic level.

PROSPECTS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

At the moment the EEU has massive potential to
be a successful trading bloc and integration project
(Niemi, 2016). There are multiple positive prospects
that currently exist within the EEU. For example,
the Eurasian Economic Commission has the staff
framework present within its numerous, specific departments to solve trade-related problems. The EEU
treaty specifically doesn’t allow for states to have reservations to EEU agreements, so states cannot “opt
out” of measures that the EEU creates (Dragneva &
Wolczuk, 2015). This is a big step toward creating
a rules-based multilateral regime. Furthermore, the
EEU is currently working with the WTO in order to
remove protectionist measures and receive the same
voting rights within the WTO as the EU has (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012). This shows that progress is
possible within the framework of the EEU.
But in order for the EEU to continue move beyond
its current stage and provide maximal prosperity for
all its members, it needs to move away from geopolitics and focus on governance (International Crisis
Group, 2016, p. 22). Geopolitics simply breeds realist fears about hostile takeovers and unequal partnerships, which does not bode well for collaboration. In order for the EEU to reach its potential, the
leaders of the Union must commit to neoliberalism
and strengthen the institutions in which they have
invested. Of course, hints of power politics will always be embedded into the project, but leaders must
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recognize it is in everyone’s best interests if decision
making mechanisms were strengthened and issues of
inequality were resolved.
The European Economic Commission must be made
stronger and be reformed to give it the capacity and
political clout to tackle non-tariff barriers and protectionism within the Union (International Crisis
Group, 2016, p. 22). Issues should not be simply
delegated up to the Supreme Council, but dealt with
along the channels that were created for its purpose.
This will increase the efficiency and prosperity of the
EEU because the Commission is staffed with experts
in economics and trade specifically, and would be
able to craft effective policy. The Court of the Eurasian Union must also be put to use for both private
parties and states wishing to settle disputes (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 22). Finally, the Union
should orient itself to deal further with problems of
social welfare and standard of living across the Union, along with fixing the broken migration and free
movement architecture (International Crisis Group,
2016, p. 22). Improved social wellbeing as a result
of the Union will mobilize the masses in support of
the EEU in an organic manner which the doctrine
of Eurasianism has failed to do among the populace
(Sakwa, 2015b, p. 167). Improving migration and
free movement architecture and allowing it to go into
practice will also benefit the Union, as it will attract
smaller countries who wish to benefit from the Russian labor import market (Schenk, 2015).
Until structural reforms happen, it would be wise to
pace integration. Before the monetary union, which
would be in effect once a common currency is established, is created, results from the common market should be measured. Before the results from the
common market could be measured, the common
market needs to function properly. The tenets of the
common market should be fulfilled before the next
step of deeper integration is pursued. Therefore, until proper institutional reform is implemented which
allows the original goals that drove integration to be
realized, the EEU should not pursue a monetary union. Though the timeline of EEU integration does
not have to exactly follow the timeline of the EU,
EEU leaders should keep in mind how long it took
for the EU to create the institutions that it currently
functions under.

However, in regards to horizontal expansion, and
adding the new members, the EEU needs to actively
continue seeking possible applicants. Because its normative rivalry with the EU and the potential threat
of a rivalry with China, the Eurasian space must
be a competitive one. In order to do this, the EEU
must capitalize on what makes it a unique project
and different from the EU and China’s potential Silk
Road Initiative. The framework for the EEU already
is in place, putting it in a normative advantage over
China’s stalled Silk Road project. Furthermore, the
EEU must exploit its focus on sovereignty and lack
of democratic requirements. This can make it an attractive project to new or incomplete democracies
whose leaders are not willing to commit resources
and political risk to “Europeanizing” their governments. From a non-Western perspective, the idea of a
multilateral institutions that does not interfere with
domestic politics can be very attractive. The EEU has
great potential with countries such as Iran, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. These countries, which would
never have even been considered as European Union
members present an opportunity for enlargement
and political allies in Asia.
Turkey also presents a potential opportunity for
EEU expansion. Once thought to be firmly a candidate for EU membership, Turkey has veered away
from the liberal democratic principles of the EU and
is charting its path closer to the partial democracies
of the EEU (Kirisci, 2016). Turkey signed the Association Agreement with the European Community
in 1963, and has since applied for membership twice
and been rejected (Redmond, 2007, pp. 305-317).
It seems that the Turkish public is becoming less enchanted with the EU with favorability ratings of the
EU among Turks falling (Dagdeverenis, 2004). The
Turkish government is also turning away from Europe. President Erdogan has used the summer 2016
coup attempt to crack down on political dissent
and consolidate his power, despite various condemnations of his actions by EU governments (Kirisci,
2016). Furthermore, the European Parliament has
voted to suspend all further accession negotiations
with Turkey, making Turkish membership in the EU
unlikely in the near future (Kanter, 2016).
This is the ideal space for the EEU to move in and attempt to forge ties with Turkey. Turkey and Kazakhstan already have longstanding relations, collaborat-
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ing on oil and natural gas pipelines (Nurgaliyeva,
2016). These oil and gas collaborations could serve as
the basis for further negotiations, as they had in the
rest of the EEU. In 2014, Turkey even began working on establishing a free trade area with the Eurasian Economic Community. However, negotiations
stalled when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter
plane, heading to Syria, leading to tense relations
between the two countries in 2015 (Genc, 2016).
Today, however, relations between Turkey and Russia have “normalized,” and might have strengthened
after the Russian Ambassador to Turkey was shot by
an ISIS operative, bringing the two countries together in their aims of fighting Islamic terrorism (Genc,
2016).
Some Turkish scholars have embraced the concept
of Eurasianism and have started turning away from
Europe (Tanrisever, 2015). Turks are starting to look
to the Turkic communities in Central Asia to historically and culturally bind them to the rest of the Eurasian nations (Tanrisever, 2015). However, in order to
fully embrace Turkey into the Eurasian community,
Eurasianism must be redefined. Some scholars view
Christian Orthodoxy as essential to the Eurasian
identity, a qualification that stands at odds with the
Muslim population of Turkey (Radzievskaya, 2014).
If the Eurasian Union embraces a definition of Eurasianism free from religious constraints however, using the social welfare focus to gain popular support
among citizens rather than an appeal to religious
fervor, they have much to gain. Turkish membership
would be a victory in the “normative rivalry” between
the EEU and the EU. Turkey would be the second
largest economy in the bloc and act as a balancer to
Russia’s power, ensuring that it would be difficult for
one nation to dominate the bloc (Nurgaliyeva, 2016).
Furthermore, Turkey’s strategic location would provide the EEU with access to the Mediterranean and
a gateway to the rest of the Middle East. The current
government in Turkey might also be incentivized by
the lack of democratic requirements to join the EEU,
allowing the Turkish government to continue to pursue its current path of power centralization. If the
EEU pursues, and successfully convinces Turkey to
accept Europe’s rejection and join the Eurasian bloc,
it would be a great victory for the EEU.

Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017

87

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER
QUESTIONS

The world is being divided into areas governed by different sets of norms that will either collaborate or rival each other (Lukyamov, 2015). The ability to persuade other nations to adopt a particular set of norms
is becoming the new test for the influence a nation
has in the international system (Lukyamov, 2015).
The EEU will be a test of Russia’s ability to create
an organization that is attractive to other nations,
led by a “third way,” Eurasian set of rules and norms
that stresses economic cooperation, while maintaining sovereignty and disregarding democratic development. Creating this attractive institution requires
both a focus on building a Eurasian community and
building the viable institutions that would be able to
facilitate economic prosperity.
The focus on building and solidifying the borders of
a “Eurasian” community was a major driving force
in the creation of the EEU. However, the rapid pace
of integration that resulted from this transactional
drive came at the expensive of viable and functioning institutions. The lack of a single case presented to
the Court of the Eurasian Union shows that the rules
based regime that Putin, Nazerbayev, and Lukashenko were attempting to create needs work. Because of
the lack of institutional framework, power politics
are allowed to flourish, reviving old Soviet-era fears
about the dominance of Moscow. However, if a commitment to liberal institutionalist reforms that prioritize rules based decision making over striking political deals are made, the EEU has a chance to flourish.
The EEU has potential for growth, but needs solid
institutions in order to compete with its normative
rival the EU and the growing power of China. However, that would be very difficult if the EEU cannot
manage its own crises or even fully implement a core
agenda, such as free movement. Reform requires
commitment from the leaders of the countries involved. But, if they realize the type of potential the
EEU can have in the international system, even the
leaders of these authoritarian-leaning countries can
act in a collective best interest and improve the institutions of the EEU.
For future study, the most pertinent question rising
out of this analysis is why exactly the staffers at the
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Eurasian Economic Commission delegate so much
responsibility up the level of the Supreme Economic
Council? Were they instructed to do so by their superiors? Is economics considered “high politics” in
post-Soviet regimes, and therefore only heads of state
are allowed to make final decisions on it? Or is there
simply self-censorship in the ranks of the Commission, when they fear retribution if they act too decisively on a core matter? Currently, no literature on
this exists and learning more about the inside mechanisms of the Commission and the Council and the
project would be a massive undertaking. However,
understanding the internal decision making structures of these organizations would allow for the creation of better modalities to ameliorate problems of
ineffectiveness and inequality.
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